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Hunsaker: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SUMMARY

UNITED STATES v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD
PROPERTY: GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
AND DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN
CIVIL FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. James Daniel Good Property,t the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
an action for civil forfeiture under the Controlled Substances
Act 2 can still be untimely even if brought within the five year
statute of limitations. 8 The court set this new precedent by interpreting the federal statutes governing forfeiture procedures·
as imposing separate reporting and notification requirements
upon various government agents and officials. II Under the court's
interpretation, if the government fails to meet these additional
and separate requirements, the action will be dismissed as un1. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1992) (per
Goodwin, J., with whom Aldisert, J., joined; Noonan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).

2. 21 U.S.C. § 881{a){7) (1988) provides that all real property which is used or intended to be used in any manner to commit, or to facilitate the commission of a drug
related violation, is subject to forfeiture to the U.S. government and no property rights
shall exist in the, property.
3. Good, 971 F.2d at 1378.
4. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1602-04 '(1988).
5. Good, 971 F.2d at 1379-81.
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timely, even if brought within five years of the
cate acts. 8
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und~rlying

predi-

The court also held that due process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard before a person's home can be taken
pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act. 7 Since defendant
Good did not receive notice or a pre-seizure hearing, the statute,
as applied, was a violation of his due process rights. 8 The court's
decision is consistent with the analysis used in an earlier Second
Circuit case9 and contradicts the conclusion reached by an earlier Eleventh Circuit court. 10 Both earlier cases deal with the
seizure of a house.
II. FACTS
On January 31, 1985, Hawaii state police officers searched
Good's house pursuant to a valid search warrant. l l The officers
uncovered almost 90 pounds of marijuana, various drug paraphernalia, and $3,187 in cash.l2 Good pled guilty to drug charges
on July 3, 1985, surrendered the cash, and served one year in
jai1. 1s
On August 8, 1989, over four years after the search of
Good's home, the United States brought this action seeking to
forfeit Good's home and property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
881(a)(7).14 The warrant authorizing seizure of Good's home, issued on August 21, 1989, was based upon the sworn affidavit of a
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) special agent.16 The affidavit
relied exclusively upon evidence obtained during the January 31,
1985 search. 18 Good neither received prior notice of the seizure,
6. [d. at 1381.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
1992).
12.

[d. The applicable statute is 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
Good, 971 F.2d at 1384.
United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258 (2nd Cir. 1989).
United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1986).
United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cir.
[d.

13. [d.
14. [d. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) is the provision of the Controlled Substances Act that

authorizes the forfeiture of real property.
15. Good, 971 F.2d at 1378.
16. [d.
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nor was he given an opportunity to be heard prior to the
seizure.17
Good filed a timely claim for the property and later filed a
motion for summary judgment and requested rents on the property.IS The government also filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district'court granted. I9 Good then appealed the
district court's decision. 20
III. BACKGROUND
The United States brought this action pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act which permits the forfeiture of real property.21 The Act does not, however, establish procedures that govern civil forfeiture. Instead, the Act incorporates the procedures
provided by the customs laws. 22
Section 1621 of the customs laws sets forth the statute of
limitations and states that no action for forfeiture can be
brought unless commenced within five years after the alleged offense was discovered. 23
Sections 1602, 1603 and 1604 of the customs laws set forth
the following reporting and notification obligations of the government: (1) Section 1602 requires any agent or officer authorized by law to make seizures to immediately report every seizure
and every violation to the appropriate official;24 (2) Section 1603
requires a customs officer to report seizures or violations of the
customs laws when discovered to the United States attorney for
the district in which the violation or seizure occurred;2& (3) Section 1604 requires the Attorney General to immediately inquire
Good, 971 F.2d at 1382.
[d. at 1378.
[d.
Good, 971 F.2d at 1378.
21. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988). The statute provides that "[t]he provisions of the law
17.
18.
19.
20.

relating to seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture. . . for violation of the customs laws
... shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred, or alleged to have been incurred,
under any of the provisions of this subchapter.... "
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1602.
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
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into the facts of cases reported by customs officers and to
"forthwith" commence proceedings for forfeiture if he determines they are necessary.26 The Good court found no cases
which interpret the five year statute of limitations set forth in
section 1621 in light of the obligations set forth in sections 16021604.27
In addition, the Controlled Substances Act does not provide
for notice or a hearing prior to a seizure of the owner's
property.1I8
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS INTERPRETATION

1.

The Majority Opinion

Initially, the majority recognized that two issues of first impression were pref!)ented: (1) the proper scope of the government's obligations under sections 1602-1604 when there has not
been a seizure prior to the commencement of the action; and (2)
the relationship between these sections and section 1621's statute of limitations. 1I9
To determine if sections 1602-1604 apply only when there
has been a seizure prior to the forfeiture action, the majority
began its analysis by interpreting the statutory language of each
section. 80 The court noted that all three sections refer not only
to seizures, but also to violations or cases reported. 81 Section
1602 provides that an agent must immediately report "every violation" of the laws. 811 Section 1603 provides that the officer owes
a duty whenever a "violation" is discovered. 88 Section 1604 provides that the Attorney General must inquire into the facts of
26. 19 u.s.c. § 1604.
27. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1379-80 (9th Cir.
1992).
28. Id. at 1382. 21 U.S.C. § 881.
29. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1378-81 (9th Cir.
1992).
30.Id.
31. Id.
32. See 19 U.S.C. § 1602; Good, 971 F.2d at 1381.
33; See 19 U.S.C. § 1603; Good, 971 F.2d at 138l.
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"cases reported to him."34 The court concluded that this language cannot be read to limit the application. of the sections only
when a seizure has occurred prior to the commencement of a
forfeiture action. 311 The court therefore held that the sections apply to the government both when seizures have taken place and
whenever violations are discovered, regardless of when the action is commenced. 36 Based on this holding, the court concluded
that the sections applied to the case at hand. 37
The majority next examined the relationship between sections 1602-1604 and the section 1621 statute of limitations. 3s
The majority scrutinized the language of section 1621, focusing
primarily on the fact that the section is phrased in the negative. 39 In particular, the majority emphasized that the language
of section 1621 provides that no suit can be brought "unless
... commenced .within five years after the time when the alleged offense was discovered. "40 The majority interpreted this
language to mean only that the government cannot bring an ac-'
tion after a five year lapse, not that the government can bring a
suit any time within five years of discovering the offense. 41 The
majority concluded that this interpretation is consistent with
the statutory language and retains a reasonable meaning when
sections 1602-1604 are viewed as imposing a separate reporting
and .notification burden on the government. 42
The majority further noted that section 1621 and sections
1602-1604 use different standards for determining when the obligations are triggered. 43 The mandates of section 1621 are triggered when the government knew or should have known of the
offense while sections 1602-1604 are triggered only by actual
knowledge. 44 This distinction, as well as the more narrow tailoring of sections 1602-1604 which apply only to certain federal of34. See 19 U.S.C. § 1604; Good, 971 F.2d at 1380.
35. Good, 971 F.2d at. 1381.
36.Id.
37.Id.
38. Good, 971 F.2d at 1381-82.
39.Id.
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1621.
41. Good, 971 F.2d at 1381 (citing United States v. 2 Burditt St., 924 F.2d 383, 385
(1st Cir. 1991)).
42. Id. at 1381-82.
43. Id. at 1381.
44.Id.
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ficers,411 provided further support for the majority's conclusion
that sections 1602-1604 impose a separate and independent obligation of reporting and notification upon the government. 46
The majority then remanded the case to develop the factual
record in order to determine exactly when the mandates of the
sections were triggered in Good's case. 47

2. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Noonan dissented only as to the part of the majority
decision which interpreted the statute of limitations. Judge
Noonan stated that the majority had converted a set of "housekeeping" rules into a statutory protection for drug oft'enders. 48
He was convinced that the only restriction should be the five
year statute of limitations, and that the majority had given a
new construction to a statute that has been in eft'ect and applied
for nearly 70 years.49
.
B.

DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS

The court began its unanimous due process analysis by finding that Good did not receive prior notice or an opportunity to
be heard before his home was seized, and that the Controlled
Substances Act does not provide for such a hearing. llo The court
then distinguished the many Ninth Circuit cases cited by the
government for the proposition that property may be seized
without a prior hearing. lIl Finally, the court analyzed the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in cases considering whether
there has been a due process violation. 1I2
45. Good, 971 F.2d at 1382. The court held that because all FBI and DEA agents are
authorized to seize property, they are subject to the mandates of §§ 1602-1604.
46. Id. at 1381.
47. Id. at 1384.
48.Id.
49.Id.
50. Good, 971 F.2d at 1382.
51. Id. at 1382-83. The court stated that all but one of these cases involve property
that can be easily removed from the jurisdiction. The court further stated that the one
case involving real property is an eighth amendment case and not a due process case.
Therefore, none of the cases cited by the government disposed of the due process claim
in Good.
52. Id. at 1382-84.
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The court first examined the rule set forth in Fuentes v.
Shevin. G3 The court noted that Fuentes requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a property
interest except in extraordinary situations. G4 The court found
that an extraordinary situation exists when there is a need for
"very prompt action."1I1I The court then stated that land cannot
be easily moved, so there is no special need for prompt action,
and the Fuentes exception does not apply when land is
involved. 1I6
The court next looked at the factors to be balanced as set
forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge. 1I7 The factors are: (1) the significance of the property interest; (2) the risk
of erroneous deprivation under current procedures; (3) the value
of additional procedures; and (4) the government's interest in a
pre-notice seizure. 1I8 After the court held that people have very
strong interests in their homes, that the government's interest in
a pre-notice seizure is minimal, and that the government's interest can easily be protected by other means,1I9 the court concluded that the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis favors a preseizure hearing. 6o
The court did not, however, use the preceding analysis to
find the statute invalid on its face. The court instead applied
the Mathews factors to. the facts of this particular case. The
court found that Good's interest in his home was substantial,
that the house was not moveable, and that the government could
protect itself by other means less restrictive than a seizure. 61
Given these findings, the court held that the statute, as applied,
violated Good's due process rights. 62
Finally, without elaborating, the court held that the due
53. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
54. Good, 971 F.2d at 1383 (citing Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 80-82).
55. [d.
56. [d.
57. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
58. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
59. Restraining orders or a bond requirement are viable options. Good, 971 F.2d at
1383-84.
60. [d. at 1383.
61. [d. at 1384.
62. [d.
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proce'ss violation did not render the forfeiture itself invalid, and
Good was entitled only to rents accrued during the illegal
seizure. 63
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit held that the government has an obligation to meet the five year requirement of section 1621 and the
notification and reporting requirements of sections 1602-1604 in
order to maintain an action for civil forfeiture. 6• Although the
court's conclusion was novel, and the decision does appear to expand protection for drug offenders, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the statutory language so that no section of the statute is
rendered meaningless. Other courts have simply ignored the existence of sections 1602-1604 and applied only the five year limit
of section 1621. The Ninth Circuit's holding recognized that sections 1602-1604 . must have some meaning or they would not
have been included in the statutory procedures governing civil
forfeiture. The court's interpretation gives meaning to sections
1602-1604 without rendering section 1621 meaningless. The interpretation was thus the most logical interpretation possible
without ignoring sections 1602-1604.
The Ninth Circuit also held, in effect, that the Controlled
Substances Act is unconstitutional when applied to forfeitures of
real property because due process requires a pre-seizure opportunity to be heard before the government can take real property.611 Rather than render the statute invalid on its face, the
court chose to send the legislature a clear message: amend the
statute to provide for a pre-seizure hearing.
Kevin T. Hunsaker*

63. [d,
64. United States v. James Daniel Good Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.
1992).
65. [d. at 1383-84.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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